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Social welfare programs in the United States are designed to serve as safety nets for people in hard
times, in contrast with the universal approach found in many other developed western nations.   In
a survey of Cliometric studies of social welfare programs in the U.S., we examine the variation in
the safety net in the U.S. across states in the 20th century, the determinants of the variation, and its
impact on socioeconomic outcomes.  The U.S. has always displayed substantial variation in the extent
of the safety net because the features of most public social welfare programs are and were determined
by local and state governments, even after the federal government became involved.  Differences across
states persist strongly for typically a decade, although the persistence weakens with time, and there
are some periods when federal intervention led to a re-ordering.  The rankings of state benefits differs
from program to program, and economic and political factors have different weights in determining
benefit levels in panel data estimation of their effects.   Variation in benefits across programs during




















                                                
A Patchwork of Programs:   A Survey of Cliometric Studies of Income Maintenance 
Programs in the United States in the First Half of the Twentieth Century 
Price Fishback, Sam Allen, Jonathan Fox, and Brendan Livingston 
  The United States has always had a much larger safety net than most people realize.   In 
the current era the United States is considered a laggard among the world’s developed economies 
in terms of social welfare expenditures.  Part of this image is driven by the fact that many 
developed nations have adopted a strategy of universal programs where all receive health care 
and family support payments.  Meanwhile, the U.S. follows a safety net strategy, in which 
private purchases of insurance and private charities play a much larger role and people typically 
do not receive payments until their income drops below specified levels.  As a result, gross 
government expenditures on social welfare in the U.S. circa 2000 are much smaller as a share of 
GDP than in Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark.  Once adjustments for taxation of benefits 
and purchases and unfunded mandates are taken into account, however, the gap narrows 
considerably.  In 1990 purchasing power dollars, net government expenditures by the U.S. in 
2003 were $5,408 per capita, which is lower than Sweden’s per capita spending of $6,259 and 
Norway’s $5901, about the same as Denmark’s 5,472, and higher than Finland’s $4,232.  Once 
private social welfare expenditures are included, the U.S. per capita net public and private social 
welfare spending rises to $7,850, which is substantially higher than Sweden’s $6,715, Norway’s 
$6,315, Denmark’s $5,818, and Finland’s $4,920.
1 
  One reason that the extent of the U.S. social safety net is under-estimated is that it is 
composed of a large patchwork system of programs.  Anybody reading the House of 
 
1 Fishback (2009) put together these comparisons from OECD statistics.  For comparisons of many countries over 
long periods of time see Lindert (2004, vols 1 and 2).  4 
 
                                                
Representative’s Ways and Means Committee’s Green Book, a massive volume providing an 
overview of social welfare programs, will by struck by the broad range of programs available for 
the poor in the United States.  Another reason that the volume is so large is that the benefits in a 
number of programs often vary substantially across states.  The responsibility for income 
maintenance programs has been centered in local and state governments since colonial times.  
Until the New Deal during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the federal government provided 
disability aid and pensions only to families of veterans of the military and its own employees on 
the grounds that problems related to unemployment and injury were local affairs.
2  Franklin 
Roosevelt’s administration argued for the expansion of federal involvement during the New Deal 
by claiming that the Great Depression was a nationwide problem that needed to be dealt with by 
a national government.   
  We seek to make sense of the broad array of social welfare programs at all levels of 
government across the United States and over time by surveying the cliometric literature on the 
history of poverty and social insurance programs during the early twentieth century.  Cliometrics 
applies economic and statistical analysis to the study of history, represented by the muse Clio, 
and thus is particularly well suited to the measurement of the extent of the programs in the 
economy.  In the course of the paper, we discuss the shifts in responsibility for public social 
welfare programs between the local, state, and federal governments and the difficulties these 
shifts present for collecting data that fully describe the patchwork system of programs in the U.S. 
over time.  The benefits offered in the programs varied a great deal across the United States in 
the early twentieth century and we explore the degree to which the relative rankings of benefits 
across the states remained stable over the course of the twentieth century.  After summarizing the 
 
2 See Moss, Skocpol, Costa, Fishback and Thomasson (2006, volume 2). 5 
 
existing studies that examine the determinants of benefits across locations prior to 1940, we offer 
some preliminary analysis of the political and economic determinants of benefits from 1940 
through 2000.  Finally, we survey a group of studies that have examined the impact of poverty 
and social insurance programs on socio-economic outcomes. 
  The Development of the Patchwork System and the Challenges Created for Data 
Collection 
  The local and state focus of social welfare spending has played havoc with the collection 
of quantitative evidence on income maintenance during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early 
twentieth centuries in the United States.  Joan Hannon and Stephen Ziliak (2006), who are 
among the few cliometricians who have performed quantitative analysis of U.S. poverty 
programs during that period, searched high and low to put together time series and cross-sections 
on welfare spending prior to 1929 for the Millennial Edition of the Historical Statistics of the 
United States.   They could only find long time series for a handful of large cities and eastern 
seaboard states, state level cross sections of pauper support from the 1850, 1860, and 1870 
censuses, and information of the number of paupers in almshouses from the 1880, 1890, 1904, 
1910, and 1923 censuses of almshouses.  The cross-sectional census comparisons are 
problematic in different ways.  The state totals from 1850 through 1870 do not match well with 
data for New York, where detailed evidence by county is available (Kiesling and Margo 1997).  
Meanwhile, the almshouses from 1880 to 1923 account for only part of the income maintenance 
programs, missing the people living in their own homes who received “outdoor” relief.    
The public spending numbers also miss the resources provided by private charities, which 
were extensive.  In the 1870s and 1880s, for example, leaders of the Charitable Organization 
Societies (COS) orchestrated the abolition of public outdoor relief programs in major cities in an 6 
 
                                                
attempt to improve the efficiency of the provision of relief, as well as provide more moral 
guidance for the poor to aid to achieve the self-reliance that would move them out of poverty.  
The move led to a large increase in private charitable donations, and the poor shifted from public 
to private relief rolls, but the change had relatively little impact on efficiency.  In comparisons to 
earlier periods, the poor stayed on the rolls roughly the same length of time, the same share (33 
to 40 percent) left the rolls for higher earnings, very few if any achieved higher occupations 
under COS management, and the ratios of expenditures per person on indoor and outdoor relief 
to the earnings of common labor share have stayed remarkably constant nationwide at around 25 
to 30 percent for most of U.S. history.
3   Even as local and state governments regained more 
control of relief around the turn of the century, private charitable donations still played a large 
role.  Recent research by Brendan Livingston (2009) on private and public funding of relief from 
1900 to 1930 shows that private charities were prevalent and provided a wide breath of services.  
Private charitable payments for income maintenance were roughly about double the payments 
made from public funds in Massachusetts between 1900 and 1930.  Local spending was also 
double state spending, with a majority of spending going towards outdoor relief.
4   
As the U.S. entered the Progressive Era of the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth 
century, state governments began playing an increasing role in income maintenance programs for 
the poor and disabled.  In the 1910s a large number of states adopted workers’ compensation and 
mothers’ pension programs, as seen in Table 1.  Workers’ compensation provided payments to 
the families of workers injured or killed in all accidents arising out of or in the course of 
 
3 See Ziliak and Hannon  2006, 2-698-9, Ziliak (1996a, 2002b, Lebergott, 1976, 61-65)  
4 Livingston’s (2009) statements are based on data reported by Massachusetts State Board of 
Charity from 1900 through 1919 and the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare  for the 
years 1920 through 1930.    7 
 
employment.  Mothers’ pensions in most states provided benefits to widows with children.  By 
1919 about one-third of the states explicitly provided benefits for mothers with children who 
were divorced or separated from their husband, two explicitly provided benefits for single 
mothers, and seven more established the law for mothers of dependent children without referring 
to marital status (Moehling 2007, 120-1).  In the late 1920s a handful of states passed laws 
creating county options to provide need-based old-age assistance to the elderly to allow them to 
live on their own rather than in almshouses.  In the early 1930s the states began raising the stakes 
and requiring local governments to provide old-age assistance payments and in many cases 
providing state funding.  In the meantime, many states were also providing payments to the blind 
to allow them to live on their own.    
The drastic problems with unemployment led to a series of responses by governments at 
all levels.  Some state and local governments expanded building programs to provide more jobs 
for workers, but their efforts were limited by declining tax revenues and the sharp rise in the 
unemployed.  In 1933 Franklin Roosevelt described unemployment as a nationwide problem, and 
the federal government established the first of a series of relief programs designed to provide aid 
to the unemployed and the destitute.  The first major program was the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA), which gave grants to the states to make direct relief payments to 
families in need and to  provide relief with a work requirement for the able-bodied.  For four 
months in the winter of 1933-34, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) hired up to 4 million 
workers for public projects.  Many of the people working on the CWA were shifted to FERA 
work relief projects in March 1934 when the CWA was phased out.  Throughout the New Deal, 
the Civilian Conservation Corps provided an opportunity for young men aged 16 to 24 from poor 
families to work on federal conservation projects often located in other states.  They worked 8 
 
roughly 40 hours per week in semi-military troops and were given room and board plus a dollar 
per day, of which the lion’s share was paid to their parents. 
Despite the emergency programs in place, estimated national unemployment rates were 
still over 20 percent in 1935 (the figure is 14.2 percent if people on work relief  were considered 
employed, see Darby 1976, 8).  Frances Townsend and others led movements calling for 
programs to offer payments to the elderly as long as they spent the money quickly.  State and 
local governments were overwhelmed by the combination of declining state revenues and the 
large numbers of poor seeking aid, and they faced constitutional restrictions on the issuance of 
debt to run deficits on current spending.  Even had they sought to issue debt for public capital 
investment, they faced high real interest rates and investors who demanded risk premiums due to 
skepticism about the state’s ability to repay the debt.    
The Roosevelt administration and Congress negotiated a realignment of the income 
maintenance programs (Wallis, Fishback, Kantor 2007).  The Roosevelt administration gained 
increased control of the short-run emergency work relief programs for the able-bodied by 
replacing the FERA programs with the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and some smaller 
programs, all of which ended in the early 1940s when World War II made them redundant.  The 
federal government returned responsibility for the “unemployable” poor to the state and local 
governments.  Many people today describe the WPA as a jobs program, but the WPA did not 
create jobs at the time the way other federal agencies did.  On the Public Works Administration 
(PWA), Public Roads Administration (PRA), and Public Buildings Administration (PBA) 
projects, the government hired contractors who then hired workers full-time at regular pay rates.  
The WPA, like the FERA before it, was a relief program with a work requirement.  They paid 
enough for basic necessities, but opportunities to work were limited and the average hourly 9 
 
earnings on these programs were typically half the average hourly earnings on PWA, PBA, and 
PRA programs.  In some southern agricultural areas, however, the WPA hourly earnings were 
comparable to or even higher than local earnings (Howard, 1941; Neumann, Fishback, and 
Kantor Forthcoming 2010).  
The long-run programs were established in the Social Security Act of 1935.  The Old Age 
Survivors’ Insurance (OASI) program, what everybody calls Social Security today, established a 
national old-age pension plan for workers with taxes collected by the federal government, which 
then paid out benefits to people who had contributed to the plan.  The federal government began 
collecting the taxes in 1938 and made the first payments to the elderly in 1940.  Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) programs were federal/state programs in which employers paid into reserve funds 
that paid benefits to unemployed workers.  The states had leeway to set their own benefits 
structure and the federal government provided funds for administering the program (Baicker, 
Goldin, and Katz, 1998).  Although the federal government had off-loaded responsibility for 
direct relief on to state and local governments, it provided matching grants to the states to 
provide aid to dependent children (ADC), old-age assistance (OAA), and aid to the blind (AB).    
Over the next few years, some states quickly passed enabling legislation that established their 
own benefit levels and met the basic federal administrative guidelines, while others delayed 
several years (see Table 1).  Nearly all states had passed the enabling legislation for 
Unemployment Insurance by 1937.  The payments of unemployment benefits were delayed until 
1938 and 1939 (see Table 1) because each state had to build up a reserve fund for two years 
before the unemployed could receive benefits.   
Unlike most developed countries, the U.S. has resisted the creation of a universal health 
insurance plan.  In the late 1910s a number of states considered adopting sickness insurance laws 10 
 
                                                
that would offer state run programs to provide partial wage replacement for workers when they 
were ill.  Such funds had been established in many European countries and were associated with 
lower adult and infant mortality rates.
5  The state run programs would have replaced many of the 
private funds operated by fraternal societies, unions, and employers during the period.  John 
Murray (2007) finds that the support among the general public for the funds was relatively weak, 
as many people with sickness insurance were satisfied with their coverage, and some without 
coverage thought the taxes would be too high for the benefits received.  The reform-minded 
American Association of Labor Legislation was not as effective at bringing together the coalition 
that contributed to the passage of workers’ compensation laws.  Employers who had supported 
workers’ compensation because they feared increasing accident payments under negligence 
liability were not as concerned with sickness insurance because there were no legal doctrines 
requiring them to pay benefits for illness.  Unions and employers with sickness funds did not 
push hard for the law because it would have reduced their competitive advantage in attracting 
workers.  Meanwhile, the American Medical Association actively opposed the legislation in most 
states.
6   
The absence of sickness insurance did not prevent state and local governments from 
contributing public funds for hospitals and hospital care.  The per capita government cost 
payments by state and city governments for specific cities in Figure 1 range from $2 to $46 year 
1990 dollars with a mean of $10.79 in 1923 and from $2 to 62 in 1930 with a mean of $13.87.  In 
addition, almshouses often provided some degree of medical care to the poor (Stoian and 
Fishback forthcoming).  During the Great Depression the Farm Security Administration (FSA) 
 
5 See Murray and Winegarten (1998)  and  Bowlbis (forthcoming) 
6 See Murray (2007) and Thomasson (2002). 11 
 
provided care from doctors and nurses in many underserved agricultural areas (Grey 1999).  
Under the auspices of the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act, the ADC, OAA, and AB 
programs began making direct payments to medical providers who treated recipients.  State and 
local governments continued providing medical services to the people receiving general 
assistance payments.  These programs were eventually phased out after the introduction of 
Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the poor in the mid-1960s (Fishback and Thomasson 
2006, 2-795).     
 
Geographic Variation and Its Persistence Over Time  
  In the patchwork of American programs the variation in benefits varies dramatically 
across geographic locations, just as they did in the per capita hospital government cost payments 
in Figure 1.  The variation is present both before and after the federal government became 
heavily involved in social welfare spending in the 1930s.  The per capita city and government 
cost payments on poverty and unemployment relief in 1923 in Figure 2 varies from lows of less 
than $1 in 1990 dollars in several southern cities to a high near $29 for several Massachusetts 
cities and a mean of $6.26.  By 1930, the spending in Figure 2 had increased in response to the 
first full year of the Great Depression to a higher average of $10.76 and the range between the 
low southern cities and the high Massachusetts cities had broadened such that benefits ranged 
between  $0.71 to $56.43.  The figure shows that this rise occurred in nearly every city, because 
all of the points are clustered in the upper left portion of the diagram.   
Over the course of the 1920s there was a clear sense of persistence in per capita 
government cost payments, as shown by the strong positive relationship between 1923 and 1930 
spending in Figure 2.  The spending per capita across cities around 1930 was influenced not only 12 
 
by the prior spending per capita in 1923 but also changes in employment.  Table 2 shows 
regressions run on the natural log of per capita city government spending on care of the poor and 
veterans in 1930 as a function of the same measure as of 1923 and the change in the natural log 
of state manufacturing employment between 1923 and 1929 (or 1931).  The coefficients can be 
read as elasticities.  The strong path dependence is still there after controlling for changes in 
employment.  Cities with per capita relief spending one percent higher in 1923, holding other 
things constant, tended to have per capita spending in 1929 and in 1931 that was 0.93 and 0.94 
percent higher, respectively.  Per capita welfare spending responded strongly to offset drops in 
the natural log of employment.  The negative elasticity implies that a one percent reduction in the 
change in the log of employment led to an increase in per capita relief spending of 1.48 percent 
in 1929 and 2.52 percent in 1931.   
Unemployment rates reached nearly 25 percent in 1933, when Franklin Roosevelt took 
office and started the New Deal relief programs.  Federal government involvement led to 
sizeable shifts in the per capita spending for relief of the poor and the unemployed.  Figure 3 
documents the dramatic rise in relief spending from all government and private sources between 
1931 and 1939 as every point lies well above and to the left of a 45 degree diagonal line from the 
origins.  The rise in spending is not necessarily due to a rise in unemployment.  These years were 
chosen because the national unemployment rates in the two years were similar at 16.3 percent in 
1931 and 14.8 percent (including work relief workers as unemployed) in 1940.  The federal 
government did not become heavily involved in relief efforts until 1933; therefore, the changes 
wrought by the federal government involvement in relief become more obvious in comparing 
these two years.  Boston, Massachusetts and Rochester, New York led the rankings in 1931 at 
over $82 per head (1990$).  By 1939 the median expenditure per capita was $221  in 1990 13 
 
dollars and spending in Brocton, Massachusetts was leading the country at over $400 (1990$) 
per capita on relief. 
The introduction of federal spending in the 1930s had two effects on the geographic 
distribution of resources.  The first was a reduction in the dispersion across cities.  The 
coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) for the 115 cities fell from 
0.95 in 1931 before federal involvement to 0.4 by 1939.  Second, the persistence in the 
geographic rankings across the decade was much weaker across the 1930s than across the 1920s.  
The raw correlation is 0.58 in Figure 3 for the 1931/1939 comparison, compared with 0.89 in 
Figure 2 for the 1923/1930 comparison.  The relationship between 1931 and 1939 per capita 
spending levels is even weaker after we control for the state of the economy in the cities in 1931 
and 1939.  The elasticity from the regression in Table 3 shows that a city with one percent higher 
relief spending per capita in 1931 on average had relief spending per capita that was only 0.17 
percent higher in 1939.  Meanwhile, the per capita spending was strongly influenced by changes 
in the labor market.  The estimated elasticity of -1.11 implies that a one percent reduction in the 
change in the log of state manufacturing employment was associated with a 1.11 percent increase 
in per capita relief spending.   
  The states still retained a great deal of control over benefit levels after the Social Security 
Act transformed the role of the federal government in social welfare programs.  Workers’ 
compensation programs have always been state programs, although federal pressures, discussed 
below, led to some convergence of benefits in the 1970s.  States retained control of basic benefit 
levels in UI and the categorical assistance programs through a shift that broadened ADC to 
become Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the 1960s and tightened 
requirements under Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) in the 1990s.  Supplemental 14 
 
Security Income (SSI) took over control of need-based payments to the elderly and the blind in 
the 1970s.   
The legacy of the Social Security Act’s reliance on state decisions about benefits is a 
relatively large variation across the country in each program to this day.  The measure of 
expected workers’ compensation benefits as a percentage of annual income for a worker earning 
the national average weekly wage in Figures 4a and 4b show a large range spanning from 0.26 to 
0.70 in 1940 that expanded to span 0.20 to 0.77 in 1970.  The range then narrowed to span 0.36 
to 0.84 in 2000.  Similarly, the maximum monthly payments under the various incarnations of 
mothers’ pensions, ADC, AFDC, and TANF measured in 1967 dollars had ranges that spanned 
$66 to $221 for four-person families under ADC in 1940, $48 to $282 for three-person families 
under AFDC in 1970, and $31 to $179 under TANF in 2000.  In discussions of the geographic 
variation of benefits in these programs we focus on the statutory benefits for workers’ 
compensation and UI and the monthly maximums offered for need-based programs like ADC, 
OAA, and AB.  The need-based programs base the payments on the household’s current 
resources and supplement them up to a monthly maximum.  In essence, the monthly maximum 
can be seen as a target base income that they are trying to reach.  The maximum has fallen for 
ADC and OAA since the 1960s, as the Food Stamp program has eliminated the need to 
supplement the food budget. 
  Another legacy of the decision to rely on the states has been a relatively strong 
persistence of the state rankings of maximum benefits in each program within the same decade 
over the period from 1970 to 2000.  Table 4 shows the cross-state correlations for benefits for 
different pairs of census years.  The second diagonal from top right to lower left, the one below 
the first diagonal composed entirely of ones, shows the correlations between the end-points of 15 
 
the same decade.  As the diagonal moves downward to the left the span between the years being 
compared increases. 
The second diagonal for UI and the family programs shows relatively weak correlations 
between 1940 and 1950.  The correlations then strengthen over time in comparisons of 1950 to 
1960, 1960 to 1970, 1980 to 1990, and 1990 to 2000.  This is likely a result of experimentation 
by the states in setting their benefits.  When the states established the original benefits for UI and 
ADC in the late 1930s, states tend to be clumped into distinct groups that chose the same benefit 
levels.  In Figure 5a there were clusters of states that paid ADC maximums in 1940 of $66, $101, 
$125, 137, and $185 in 1967 dollars.  Clusters for UI weekly maximums in 1940 are found at 
$36, $38, and $43 in 1967 dollars in Figure 6a.  Over time the states refined their choices and 
there was much less clustering in Figures 5b and 6b.  As a result, the correlations between 1940 
and 1950 benefits across states was only 0.1069 for UI and 0.34 for AFDC.  The correlations for 
1950 and 1960 rose to 0.42 for UI and 0.76 for ADC.  By the latter part of the twentieth century 
the correlations for UI reached as high as 0.8037 for 1990 and 2000 and 0.93 for the same years 
for ADC.  Workers’ compensation did not go through the same experimentation process in the 
1940s and 1950s because most laws were passed in the 1910s.  Thus, the correlations between 
1940 and 1950 were near or above 0.7 in all comparisons except 1970 and 1980.   
It is worth noting that the relative rankings are not set in stone for the long run.  As the 
time span increases, comparisons of the correlations as you read down the same column show 
that the correlations weaken significantly.  Thus the correlations for workers’ compensation 
benefits fall from 0.92 for 1930 and 1940 to 0.78 for 1930 and  1950 to 0.68 for 1930 and 1960, 
to 0.58 for 1930 and 1970, and below 0.3 for 1930 and later years.     16 
 
Differences in the target groups of the income maintenance programs lead to relatively 
weak correlations between UI and ADC and between workers’ compensation and ADC in Table 
5.  UI and workers’ compensation target people who are typically employed, while ADC and SSI 
tend to target people without employment or at the very low end of the employment scale.  The 
correlations between workers’ compensation and UI within the same year in 1940 and 1950 were 
nearly zero before they strengthened to rise above 0.4 after 1970.  Correlations between workers’ 
compensation and ADC within the same year rise to peak around 0.55 in 1960 and then weaken a 
great deal through 2000.  The correlations between UI and ADC within the same year are weak 
in 1940 and 1950, they peak at 0.56 in 1960 and then fall to 0.36 by 2000.  The correlations 
within the same year of SSI with workers’ compensation and UI in 1990 and 2000 are also 
relatively weak.  The strongest correlations are found between the need-based programs of ADC 
and SSI in 1990 and 2000.    
 
The Political Economy of the Variation in Benefits 
Both mothers’ pensions and workers’ compensation were adopted in the majority of the 
states in a relatively short period of time during the heyday of the Progressive Era in the 1910s.   
Efforts to aid the “worthy” poor who were struck by misfortune through no fault of their own 
drew backing from a diverse set of interest groups, ranging from major business and civic leaders 
to reform groups.  Despite the broad-based support for the basic concepts, there was extensive 
debate about the specific features of the laws.  The debate surrounding the benefit levels was 
particularly contentious.    
In preliminary cross-sectional analyses of the factors determining the generosity of 
mothers’ pensions in 1919, 1929, and 1940, Carolyn Moehling (2006) found that states where 17 
 
                                                
women’s clubs endorsed mothers’ pension legislation earlier tended to choose less generous 
pensions.  The negative relationship indicates the conflicts in the objectives of pension 
advocates.  The early leaders of the mothers’ pension movement wanted to provide relief to the 
“deserving” poor, but they feared the creation of a permanent pauper class, a common fear 
throughout the progressive era.  They did not want to raise benefits high enough to encourage 
desertion or divorce by spouses.  Nor did they want to attract migration to the state to take 
advantage of higher benefits.  The generosity of benefits was also lower in states with more 
blacks and higher in areas where women were a larger share of the labor force. 
  Even though significant numbers of employers, workers, and insurers anticipated gains 
from workers’ compensation legislation, there were still intense debates over benefits and other 
features of the law.
 7   In some cases, as in Missouri, the political maneuvering led to delays in 
adoption of the law.  Fishback and Kantor (1998, 2000) performed an analysis of a panel of 
workers’ compensation benefits between 1911 and 1930 to try to examine the factors influencing 
the levels of benefits chosen.  They found that prior to 1930, employers in high risk industries 
generally succeeded in keeping benefits low.  On the other hand, states with more unionized 
manufacturing industries served as a countervailing force to push benefits higher.  Once officials 
 
7 Fishback and Kantor (2000) showed that the political economy of the original adoption of workers’ compensation 
was the result of groups of employers and insurance companies joining with groups of reformers and workers to 
pass the laws.  The employers anticipated a reduction in uncertainty about their accident liability payments 
associated with the negligence laws and changing court decisions.  Employers also ending up passing along a 
significant portion of the costs of the new workers’ compensation benefits through compensating wage reductions 
for nonunion workers.  Despite the wage offsets, many non-union workers still benefited from the new law because 
they were better insured against accident risk.  They typically received payments for nearly all accidents and the 
average payouts overall tended to be higher than negligence liability.  The insurance companies also benefited from 
selling a great deal more workers’ compensation insurance than they had sold previously of the combined package 
of employers’ liability insurance and worker’s accident insurance, although they benefited less when the state 
created a competitive insurer or lost out in the seven states that created a monopoly state insurer.  The issue of state-
provided insurance raised the hackles of insurers and those fearful of government replacement of general business.   
Fishback and Kantor (2000) found state insurance schemes were adopted in the states where unions and progressive 
reformers had more strength.    18 
 
were in place to administer workers’ compensation laws they also pressed for higher workers’ 
compensation benefits.  Finally, states in which the legislature shifted parties in both houses also 
tended to raise workers’ compensation benefits as part of their new reforms when they took 
office.     
In the original debates over workers’ compensation, reformers and workers’ advocates 
often accepted compromises on the initial benefits in hopes of putting some law in place and then 
seeking to raise the benefits in the future.  Benefit levels therefore have continued to be a source 
of contention to the present day.  A key determinant of the actual benefit levels paid is the 
weekly maximum benefit payment, which was originally set as a specific amount in nominal 
dollars.  The law might state that the worker was eligible to receive as much as two-thirds of 
their normal weekly earnings, but a low maximum weekly payment could cut that percentage 
sharply.  In fact, Allen’s (2004, 2009) analysis of benefits and wages shows that the weekly 
maximum was binding for more than 90 percent of workers in various dangerous jobs across 
several census years.   
As wages rose with inflation, a very common experience throughout the century, 
legislatures had to adjust the weekly maximums for benefits to keep pace with nominal wage 
increases.  The legislatures, many which met only every two years, often raised the weekly 
maximums after inflation eroded the benefits as a share of income.  This led to the annual 
fluctuations in the national average expected benefit as a percentage of annual manufacturing 
wages, holding accident rates constant seen in Figure 7.  The national average disguises much 
larger fluctuations within the states.  The legislative delays also meant that workers’ 
compensation benefits as a share of manufacturing earnings stayed below its 1930s level until the 
early 1970s.  As can be seen in the plots of workers’ compensation benefits as a share of annual 19 
 
income in 1940 and 1970 in Figure 4a, the bulk of the states rest at points below a 45 degree line, 
which shows that most state legislatures allowed inflation to erode expected benefits in ways that 
caused the benefits relative to wage to be lower in 1970 than they were in 1940.   
Samuel Allen (2009) shows that there was a substantial change in the situation in the 
1970s.  The federal government sponsored a National Commission on Workers’ Compensation 
Laws in 1972 to assess the adequacy of state-mandated benefits.  The National Commission 
called for several major reforms in state workers’ compensation laws, including a large increase 
in benefit levels.  Further, it added teeth to these recommendations by recommending that the 
federal government take control of workers’ compensation if the states did not adopt substantial 
reforms.  Indeed, a congressional bill was proposed that would have reopened the claims 
procedure in states with “inadequate” benefits and required payment of the benefit shortfall in 
those cases.    
One of the Commission’s key recommendations was that the states move away from their 
practice of setting nominal maximum levels for weekly benefits every few years to indexing the 
benefits to change with changes in the weekly wage rates in the states.  Prior to 1972, only a 
handful of states had begun indexing their benefits.  After the National Commission report, the 
vast majority of states made the shift.  As a result, the expected benefits as a share of annual 
earnings, holding accident rates constant, rises sharply in the 1970s and then displays a slightly 
rising trend thereafter.  This is seen in Figure 7.  Similarly, the plots of expected benefits in each 
state in 1970 and 2000 show that the workers’ compensation benefits area all clustered in the 
upper left of Figure 4b.  Allen performed a hazard analysis of the timing of the shift and found 
that states tended to adopt the indexing earlier if they already had high benefits, and had state 
senates that were dominated by Democrats.  Southern states were slower to adopt the procedure.  20 
 
                                                
In contrast to the Fishback and Kantor studies prior to 1930, neither union representation nor the 
administrative structure of workers’ compensation appeared to matter much.  
The shift in procedure for benefit adjustments also led to a sharp change in the impact of 
various factors to the level of benefits.  Allen set up a panel data set with annual information for 
the states for each year from 1940 through 2000 on the real level of benefits as a function of 
interest group activity, and political measures with interaction terms that allowed estimation of 
the change in the effect of the measures after 1972.  The analysis controls for year and state fixed 
effects and the structure of industries.  Prior to 1972, the level of real wages had a weak positive 
relationship with the level of real expected benefits.  After the commission report, the 
relationship strengthened a great deal; the elasticity implied that a one percent rise in real wages 
was associated with a 0.565 percent rise in real benefit levels.  In the pre-1972 period, more 
unionization was associated with higher benefit levels.  In the post-commission period the shift 
to indexing weakened the relationship with annual changes in unionization.  In a similar fashion, 
the effects of Democratic leadership in the state legislature was strong before 1972 and 
weakened after the Democrats succeeded in pushing for indexing of wages. 
A large literature debates the reasons why there was a very large variation in the 
distribution of all types of New Deal funds, which is surveyed in Fishback, Kantor and Wallis 
(2003).
 8  We will focus here on the specific factors related to the variation in the per capita 
spending on relief.  In a famous Fireside Chat, Roosevelt proclaimed that the New Deal would 
promote “Relief, Recovery, and Reform.”  Conservatives, critics and big businessmen charged 
the New Dealers with the more cynical purpose of using government programs to build 
 
8 See  Couch and Shughart (1998), Wallis (1984, 1987, 1988 1998, 2001), Wright (1974), Reading (1973), 
Anderson and Tollison (1991), Fleck (1994, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2001, 2008); Stromberg (2004), Arrington 
(1970), Reading (1973), Mason (2003).  For discussions of corruption, see Fishback, Kantor and Wallis (2004).   21 
 
                                                
patronage and to “buy” voters to ensure the continuation of the Democrat’s hegemony over the 
federal government.  Many modern programs have explicit formulas that determine the 
distribution of federal spending through matching grants and specific counts.  The inner 
workings of the emergency New Deal programs are more difficult to fathom.  Explicit formulas 
for matching funds written into the FERA legislation were largely deemed unworkable after the 
first three months.  Senate testimony from FERA administrators on the distribution of funds 
offers a long list of factors that were considered but little guidance on the weights each factor 
was given.  Similarly, the WPA matching requirements were routinely ignored and the shares of 
funds provided by state and local governments varied widely.  
Nearly all of the statistical analysis of the distribution of relief spending and emergency 
jobs have estimated regressions using cross-sections of counties, cities, or states.  All find that 
the relief programs distributed funds to areas with at least one or more of the following: higher 
unemployment earlier in the 1930s, more of a decline in income, and lower long-term incomes.  
They also find, however, that there is evidence of political maneuvering in a variety of 
sophisticated forms.
9  Various studies have shown that more monies were distributed in areas 
with higher voter turnout, more swing voting, and loyal voters (Fleck 1999c, 2001a; Fishback, 
Kantor, and Wallis 2003; Wright 1974; Stromberg 2004; Couch and Shughart 1998).  Fleck 
(2001a) fine tuned the analysis to show that loyal voters mattered more in states loyal to the 
Democrats and swing voters mattered more in states where swing voting was more common.  
Stromberg (2004) showed that the Roosevelt administration spent more money where there were 
more radios, which gave them an advantage in gaining credit for the monies.  More recently, 
 
9 See Fleck (1999a, 1999b) shows that greater voter turnout, swing voting, and  loyal voters all mattered to the 
distribution of FERA spending and WPA work relief jobs.  Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) 22 
 
Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor (2010? forthcoming) have used a panel of monthly evidence to 
examine the extent to which the Roosevelt administration used the timing of relief spending to 
influence elections.  There was a clear pattern in the raw data showing increased spending near 
election times, particularly in 1936 and 1938.  The WPA defended the timing by arguing that 
these were periods of high unemployment (Howard 1941).  After controlling for changes in 
employment and nationwide shocks, the panel study finds that there were rises in spending in the 
months immediately before the November elections and a decline in spending in December.     
To supplement the work by Sam Allen on the factors influencing workers’ compensation 
benefits from 1930 through 1940, we have done some preliminary analyses on the relationships 
between the benefit maximums for the family aid programs and UI and political parties and 
incomes across states for the years 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.  The 
estimating equation takes the following form. 
 
  Bst = β0 + β1 Yst + β2 Pst + Δ + ￿ + Δ*time + εst, 
 
where Bst is the natural log of the maximum benefit in 1967 dollars in year t and state i.  Yst is 
the natural log of average income in 1967 dollars over the decade (average for 1931 through 
1940 for 1940, 1941 through 1950 for 1950, etc.).  Pst is a vector of averages across the  decade 
of political measures, including the average of the percent voting for the Democratic presidential 
candidate, the average percent voting for other presidential candidates aside from Democrats and 
Republicans, the share of years in which the state simultaneously had a Democratic governor and 
the percent Democrat exceeded the percent Republican in both houses of the state legislature, the 
previous Democratic state dominance measure interacted with a southern dummy, the share of 23 
 
years in which the state simultaneously had a Republican governor and the percent Republican 
exceeded the percent Democrat in both houses of the state legislature, and the share of years in 
which both legislatures shifted party dominance during the decade.  The Δ is a vector of state 
dummies that control for features of the states that do not vary over time, and ￿ is a vector of 
year dummies to control for nationwide shocks to the political economy.  The vector Δ is 
interacted with a time counter (1900=0) to control for state-specific time trends.  The error term 
εst captures factors that are not measured in the analysis.  Results are shown in Table 6 with and 
without the state and year fixed effects and the state specific time trends to show how the 
inferences change when these are not included. 
  The relationships between benefits and income change sharply as we add more controls 
to the analysis.  When the state and year fixed effects and the state-specific time trends are not 
included, there is a strong positive relationship between personal income in the state and the 
maximum UI weekly benefit.  The statistically significant coefficient implies that a one percent 
rise in state per capita income is associated with a 0.336 percent rise in the maximum UI benefit.   
Once state effects are included to control for long-term features of the state and nationwide 
changes associated with the years, the effect becomes statistically insignificant and slightly 
negative, and the effect gets smaller still when the state-specific time trends are added.  
Meanwhile, the relationship between ADC Benefits and average personal income is negative in 
the absence of the state and year fixed effects and trends.  Once we control for all three, the 
relationship changes markedly and becomes positive and statistically significant, so that richer 
states are more generous to the poor.  A one percent rise in state per capita personal income is 
associated with a family maximum benefit that is 0.448 percent higher.  In the case of the 24 
 
dependent children benefits, it is particularly important to add the year fixed effects to control for 
changes in the definition of the measure being used.   
   The effect of political parties tends to show strongly without the extra controls.  Both 
types of benefits tended to be higher in states that tended to vote for Democrats for president and 
when there were more shifts in party dominance in the state legislature in the prior decade.  In 
addition, the dependent children benefits were lower in states that voted for someone besides 
major party candidates in presidential elections and in southern states where Democrats 
dominated all parts of state government.  The benefits were higher in areas where Republicans 
succeeded in capturing control of all aspects of state government.  However, these effects are 
much weaker and statistically insignificant as we add the state and year fixed effects and then the 
state-specific time trends.   
  There is some debate among social scientists about the use of state and year fixed effects 
and state-specific time trends.  Some claim that the extra controls are correlated with components 
of the remaining variables in the analysis.  For example, if a state is fundamentally Democratic, 
the coefficient of the state fixed effect may also be picking up the role of Democrats in the state.  
Thus the coefficient of the Democratic variable when the state fixed effect is included is just 
capturing deviations from the long term fundamental Democratic nature of the state.  On the 
other hand, there may be other time-invariant factors that are not measured in the model being 
estimated that influence the benefit levels and happen to be correlated with the Democrats.  If so, 
the coefficient of the Democrat variable in an equation that eliminates the fixed effects and time 
trends is going to be biased in ways that will cause mis-measurement of the relationship. 
  We can get a sense of which states are most generous after controlling for income and 
political party by examining the coefficients of the fixed effects.  For unemployment insurance 25 
 
benefits, the states in the top ten include Connecticut, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, New York, New 
Jersey, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Colorado, Delaware and Kansas.  The states in the bottom ten 
include Mississippi, Indiana, Alabama, South Dakota, Arizona, South Carolina, Florida, 
Missouri, Tennessee, and Georgia.  For dependent child benefits the top ten include Connecticut, 
New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California, New York, Minnesota, Vermont, Massachusetts, Utah, 
and Washington and the bottom ten are Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, Arkansas, 
Tennessee, Texas, Louisiana, Georgia, Florida, and Kentucky.   
      
The Impact of Public Income Maintenance Programs on Socio-Economic Outcomes Before 
1950 
There is a growing cliometric literature on the impact of social insurance and poverty 
programs on various measures of socio-economic welfare in the U.S. between 1900 and 1950.  
The stated primary goal of each program was to provide resources to people who have 
experienced either a drop in income or are permanently stuck in a low income situation.  It seems 
obvious that receiving poverty and social insurance payments would make the person better off 
in the short run.  Absent fraudulent activity, the recipient’s income is higher during a period 
where their income is low.  Some of the policy analyses therefore focus on how the programs 
influenced non-income measures for a class of people, such as mortality rates, family formation, 
crime rates, and other factors.  Others show how the programs influence the incentives for other 
decision makers in the rest of the economy.  For example, an increase in public spending on 
poverty relief might lead to reductions in private charitable giving or might lead to downward 
adjustments in wages in the labor market because potential recipients are better protected by the 26 
 
public policy against bad times.  Such changes, whether unintended or recognized in advance by 
policy makers, tend to offset the benefits of the public program to the recipients of the benefits.    
The studies summarized in Table 8 tend to follow a similar set of procedures.  The 
policies all varied across state and sometimes counties, so researchers have collected information 
on key features of the policies for each location.  In most cases the researchers have put together 
panel data sets in which there is both variation across locations in any one year and variation 
across time within locations in the outcome measure and the policy measure.  The number of 
years in the panels ranges from 2 years to more than 10 years.  Most of the studies use state or 
county averages in a particular year as the unit of observation.  Given that the policies typically 
varied by state and time, use of averages for the outcome variables may not lead to severe 
aggregation bias.  A small number of studies have access to information on individuals, but they 
do not have information on the same individual for more than one year and so the cross-sections 
are pooled into “pseudo-panels.”      
All the studies seek to identify the impact of the policy on the outcome in multi-variate 
analysis that includes other factors that influence the outcome.  Over the past twenty years, 
economic historians have paid increasing attention to elimination of “endogeneity bias,” which 
might arise when the policy measure is correlated with the error term in the regression equation 
to be estimated.  This type of bias can occur if key variables that are correlated with both the 
outcome and the policy are not included in the analysis.  This “omitted variable bias” in the 
coefficient is a multiplicative function of the correlation between the left-out variable and the 
outcome variable and the correlation between the left-out variable and the policy measure.   
Endogeneity bias might also arise if there is a feedback relationship such that the outcome 
variable itself influences the decision makers when they design the policy measure.  For 27 
 
example, in a study of the impact of a program on average incomes, there are likely to be 
situations where decreases in average incomes lead to adoption of a more generous poverty 
policy.  This feedback will cause the estimates of the impact of the poverty program to be less 
positive than the true causal relationship between the program and income.     
To deal with the omitted variable problem, all of the studies adopt some form of the 
following estimating equation.  In this case the estimation is performed on a panel with each 
observation as an average from state s in year t.   
 
  Ost = β0 + β1POLICYst + β2 Xst + Δ + ￿ + Δ*time + εst, 
 
where Ost is the outcome measure in year t and state s,  POLICYst is a measure of the policy, and  
Xst is a vector of a set of factors that vary across states and time that influence the outcome 
measure.  To control for factors in each state that do not vary across time within a state but do 
vary across states, a vector Δ of state fixed effects is included.  Such factors might include the 
fundamental legal environment, the climate, and other factors.  A vector ￿ of year effects can be 
included to control for factors that hit all states in the same year but vary across years, such as 
wars, monetary policy, and the introduction of new nationwide knowledge.  Another vector of 
state-specific time trends (Δ*time) can be used to control for trends within each state that vary 
across states.  The error term (εst) is the sum of all of the unmeasured factors.   
 The  coefficient  β1 is an estimate of the relationship between a change in policy and a 
change in the outcome.  In statistics, there is no way to ascribe true causation to this estimate of 
the relationship because statistics can only get at correlation.  If the POLICYst measure is not 28 
 
correlated with the error εst, then β1 is often considered an unbiased measure of the relationship.  
Economists also use the term “causal” in this situation.   
  In seeking to control for omitted variable bias, some of the earlier studies only included 
the vector Xst of variables that varied across time and place.  Worries that there are many factors 
that have gone unmeasured has led economists to increasingly use the state and year fixed effects 
and state-specific time trends to reduce the potential problems with omitted variable bias.  These 
extra controls have the advantage of controlling for all sorts of factors that had gone unmeasured, 
but that were correlated with both the outcome and policy variables.  On the other hand, 
researchers do not necessarily know which factors are being controlled by the fixed effects  and 
some researchers are worried that the fixed effects and state time trends are picking up some 
aspects of the policy and causing the β1 estimate to understate the policy effects.    
To some extent, the fixed effects and state time trends control for the feedback form of 
endogeneity.  Researchers have also explored using instrumental variable (IV) analysis in which 
they seek a variable that is correlated to a reasonable degree with the policy measure but is 
uncorrelated with the error term εst.  It should be emphasized that this is composed of the 
unobservables after controlling for all of the other factors in the equation.  Nearly all of the 
studies that use the IV approach use a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach in which a 
first-stage equation of the following form is estimated. 
 
POLICYst  = α0 + α1Instrumentst + α2 Xst + Δ1 + ￿1 + Δ1*time + ust, 
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Note that the equation includes all of the factors in the right hand side of the earlier equation 
along with the instrumental variable.  Then a prediction of the Policy variable is substituted in 
the final stage outcome equation.    
 
  Ost = γ0 + γ1Predicted POLICYst + γ2 Xst + Δ2 + ￿2 + Δ2*time + εst, 
 
This technique is designed to capture the impact of the portion of the actual policy measure that 
is correlated with the instrument, and thus not correlated with the error term in the final equation.  
There are potentially a number of instruments that might be used and there is no guarantee that 
the results will always be the same for each instrument. 
  Most of the studies in Table 7 show comparisons of the results with estimates of the raw 
relationship between the policy and the outcome in the absence of any controls, as well as 
estimates with the various controls included.  In many cases, the inclusion of the controls reduces 
the absolute value of the coefficient, suggesting that omitted variable bias is a problem when just 
looking at raw correlations or graphs of the relationship between the outcome and policy 
variable.  In a number of cases, but not all, the use of IV estimation leads to stronger 
relationships between the policy measure and the outcome that was disguised in the coefficient 
estimates performed without instrumental variables.   
  The studies of workers’ compensation, the first of the major social insurance programs  
summarized in Table 7, show that the switch to workers’ compensation laws served to raise the 
average amounts of post-accident compensation received by workers when they were injured.  
The changes in liability rules and in the size of benefits were associated with reductions in non-
union hourly earnings in dangerous industries like coal mining and lumber.  Unionized workers 30 
 
were more effective at staving off these reductions and thus gained more from the legislation.  
The initial introduction of social insurance, however, did not always influence wages.  When 
unemployment insurance programs began paying benefits in the late 1930s, there is no sign that 
hourly earnings adjusted downward (Balkan, 1998).   
  The impact of workers’ compensation on accident rates was more complex and largely 
determined by the relative costs of preventing accidents for workers and employers.  Since 
workers’ compensation insurance premiums were experience-rated, higher post-accident benefits 
gave employers more incentive to prevent accidents while allowing workers to be less careful.  
Panel data studies by several scholars show that workers’ compensation laws were associated 
with higher accident rates in coal mining, where the costs to employers of preventing accidents 
were high enough that they chose to pay higher premiums rather than incur the very high costs of 
doing more to prevent accidents in each miner’s workplace deep in the mine.  In manufacturing, 
where employers had much more control over the conditions in the workplace, some studies 
show a reduction in accident rates when workers’ compensation was introduced.   
  When mothers’ pensions were introduced in many states, the opponents feared that the 
provision of benefits to female-headed households might lead to higher divorce or separation 
rates.  The compromise solution in a number of the states was to limit payments to widowed 
mothers.  Carolyn Moehling has assessed the impact of mothers’ pension and ADC laws on 
family formation using individual level data from the Census during several years.  Her results 
suggest that divorce rates and separation rates were higher in states with more generous mothers’ 
pension programs by  1920.  She does not find the same kinds of effects for the years 1940, 
1950, and 1960 after the Social Security Act established the federal matching programs for the 
state ADC programs that replaced mothers’ pensions in the late 1930s.  She does find a relatively 31 
 
strong positive relationship between family break-ups and ADC benefits for white women in 
1970. 
  The original state old-age assistance laws declared that one goal was to provide enough 
benefits to the elderly to live on their own.  Dora Costa (1999) has found that higher benefits 
under the federal matching grant version of old-age assistance established under the Social 
Security framework after 1935 allowed more women to live on their own.  Work by Leora 
Friedberg (1999) and Donald Parsons (1991) shows that OAA allowed a significant number of 
elderly to stay out of the labor force.     
  OAA did not have as many salutary effects on the mortality rates of the elderly.  Even 
though raw correlations suggest that the introduction of OAA was associated with lower death 
rates among the elderly between 1930 and 1938, Stoian and Fishback (forthcoming 2010) find 
that death rates fell as much or more in the same states for other age groups not eligible for 
OAA.  They suggest that OAA had little effect on death rates in the 1930s because it largely was 
substituting for benefits through almshouses and other programs that the elderly were receiving 
under the general poverty programs.  Andreea Balan Cohen finds that OAA is associated with 
lower death rates in the 1940s and 1950s in part because a broader range of the elderly received 
benefits.  In addition, new technologies like penicillin in the early 1940s meant that relatively 
small increases in benefits in the 1940s and 1950s could be used to purchase much more 
effective treatments of some mortal illnesses that had not been treatable in the 1930s. 
  On the other hand, poverty relief programs in the 1920s and 1930s were more successful 
at reducing death rates among the most vulnerable population in society, infants below the age of 
one.  Jonathan Fox (2009) finds that an additional $780,000 (in 2007$) of spending in cities on 
poverty relief before the New Deal was associated with the reduction of one infant death.  Public 32 
 
health education programs were even more successful.  Death rates for children older than one 
were not influenced nearly as much by these programs.  The federal government began offering 
very large amounts of relief funds in 1933 that swamped the spending by state and local 
governments before.  Fishback, Haines and Kantor (2007) find that about $2 million (in 2000$) 
in additional relief spending associated with reduction of one infant death, half a homicide, one 
suicide, 2.4 deaths from infectious disease, one death from diarrhea in large urban areas between 
1929 and 1940.  Greater relief spending also gave families enough income to allow them to 
return to more normal fertility rates.   
Relief spending also contributed to reductions in property crime rates.  Shawn Kantor, 
Ryan Johnson and Price Fishback (forthcoming) examine crime rates in 81 cities during the 
1930s.  They find that work relief poverty programs, like the WPA, served to reduce property 
crime rates.  A ten percent increase in spending on work relief was associated with a 1.5 percent 
reduction in property crime.  In most specifications the effect of relief payments without a work 
requirement was smaller in part because people on direct relief were not having their hours 
soaked up by a work requirement during the day.  Relief spending was not as successful as 
private employment in reducing property crime.  The estimates suggest that a one percent decline 
in employment in a city was associated with a one percent rise in property crime rates in the 
1930s.  The employment results are similar to findings in a study of the U.S. between 1979 and 
1997 published by Steven Raphael and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer in the Journal of Law and 
Economics in 2001.   
The federal government’s spending on emergency relief programs like the FERA and the 
WPA during the 1930s led to complaints by some employers that they created disincentives for 
workers to accept private employment, and thus work relief jobs in particular might crowd out 33 
 
private employment.  The debate in the 1930s mirrored the long standing discussions of the 
issue, which suggested that benefits for the unemployed provided an outside option that raised 
unemployed workers’ reservation wage when seeking private employment.  What was unusual in 
the 1930s was that the unemployment rate was so high, over 20 percent in several years, that 
there seemed to be plenty of unemployed workers to soak up before crowding out could occur.     
A series of labor market studies cited in Table 7 offer conflicting pictures of the impact of 
relief programs on private employment in the 1930s.  Studies of cross-sectional data using IV 
estimation by Robert Fleck (1999) for county data in 1937 and 1940 and by John Wallis and 
Daniel Benjamin (1981) using city data in 1934/1935 suggest that areas with higher relief 
employment did not experience a reduction in private employment.   
On the other hand, studies using panel data sets, which allow the research to take 
advantage of variation both across geographic areas and over time, find some degree of crowding 
out that varies across time.  In the early years of the decade when unemployment was at its peak 
above 20 percent, Kent Matthews and Daniel Benjamin (1992) find that the addition of one work 
relief job reduced private employment by about one-third of a job, while Todd Neumann, Price 
Fishback, and Shawn Kantor (forthcoming 2010) find a slight positive effect of relief spending 
on private employment.  After 1935, when unemployment rates fell below 20 percent, both 
studies find that an additional work relief job was associated with a reduction of up to nine/tenths 
of a private job.   
The relief jobs may have helped workers in ways that, oddly enough, caused the official 
measures of unemployment to rise.  High unemployment rates often discourage workers from 
seeking work.  These discouraged workers are not considered unemployed under standard 
definitions of unemployment, which require that someone be actively seeking work to be defined 34 
 
as unemployed.  Meanwhile, during the 1930s relief workers were treated as unemployed in the 
official statistics.  As a result, when a relief job in the 1930s became available and was filled by a 
discouraged worker, the number of unemployed in the official statistics rose by one.  Hence we 
see the odd effect that the creation of an additional relief job could make the official 
unemployment statistics look worse during the 1930s.   
The impact of public works and relief programs extended well beyond the labor market.  
An added dollar of public works and relief spending in a U.S. county was associated with an 
increase in retail sales of roughly 40 cents (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor 2005).  Given typical 
ratios of retail sales to income, this suggests that incomes in the county grew roughly 85 cents at 
the mean when a dollar was added to public works and relief spending.  Counties with greater 
public works and relief spending appeared to be more attractive to workers, as these counties 
experienced more in-migration during the 1930s (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2006; 
Sorensen, Fishback, and Kantor 2008).    
Summary 
  Social welfare programs in the United States are designed to serve as safety nets for 
people who hit hard times, which contrasts with the universal approach found in many other 
developed western nations.   Even though the focus is more on the safety net, modern U.S. public 
social welfare spending per capita spending rivals the spending in other western countries in 
comparisons based on purchasing power parity.  Include private social welfare spending and the 
U.S. ranks among the highest in the world in total per capita social welfare spending. 
  The average for the U.S. disguises enormous variation in the extent of the programs 
within across states within the United States.  This variation arose in part because most public 
social welfare programs were the responsibility of local and state governments until the New 35 
 
Deal programs were introduced during the Great Depression.  Even after the federal government 
became involved,  many  federal programs have left decisions about benefit levels and other 
features in the hands of the states, after setting some base rules and offering matching grants.  
Thus, there still remains extensive variation across states over time.  For most types of programs, 
the cross-state correlations of benefit levels at the end-points of a decade are relatively high, 
although the strength of the correlation weakens as the interval between years compared rises.  
There were some periods when federal intervention or threats of intervention led to a re-ordering 
of benefit levels across states, including the New Deal’s impact on per capita relief spending 
during the 1930s and the shifts in workers’ compensation benefits seen in the 1970s.  The 
patchwork nature of the safety net is illustrated best by the correlations of benefit levels for 
different programs in the same year.  The correlations are relatively low suggesting that benefit 
generosity in one program was not tightly matched by generosity in other programs within the 
same state.  Analysis of the economic and political determinants of benefit levels suggests that 
both economic and political factors influenced the process, although their importance varies from 
program to program. 
  All of the programs are designed to provide resources to people in dire straits.  It seems 
obvious that more resources makes the recipient better off in the short run; therefore, most of the 
cliometric studies of the benefit programs have focused on the indirect and/or unintended 
consequences of the programs.  Wage reductions for nonunion workers were associated with 
increases in workers’ compensation benefits in the early years although not with the introduction 
of unemployment insurance programs in the late 1930s.  The introduction of workers’ 
compensation had varied effects on accident rates that depended strongly on the costs to 
employers of preventing accidents.  Mothers’ pension programs contributed to an increase in 36 
 
separations and divorces when they were first introduced, but the matching-grant Aid to 
Dependent Children programs that replaced mothers’ pensions in the 1930s showed little 
relationship to breakups until after 1960.  Old Age Assistance programs had little impact on 
elderly death rates in the 1930s, in part because the elderly were being moved off of general 
welfare rolls.  By the 1940s when penicillin was introduced, the programs contributed to 
reductions in death rates.  The programs also allowed more elderly women to live on their own 
and reduced the labor supply of the elderly in 1940 and 1950.  Studies of a range of effects of 
general relief and work relief programs in the 1920s and 1930s suggest that they contributed to 
reduced death rates for infants and for specific types of diseases, lowered crime rates, increased 
economic activity and stimulated in-migration into the counties with more spending.        
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Year of First 
Payments to 
Unemployed 
Alabama   1919 1951  1931 1936    ---- No 1938 
Alaska   1915 1945  1917 1945  1915  No 1939 
Arizona   1913 1943  1917 1936  1933  No 1938 
Arkansas   1939 1940  1917 1936    ----  Yes 1939 
California   1911 1915  1913 1936  1929  Yes 1938 
Colorado   1915 1945  1912 1936  1927  Yes 1939 
Connecticut   1913 1930  1919 1941    ----  Yes 1938 
Delaware   1917 1937  1917 1936  1931  No 1939 
Florida   1935 1945  1919 1938    ---- No 1939 
Georgia   1920 1945 ---- 1937    ---- No 1939 
Hawaii   1915 1930  1919 1937  1933  no 1939 
Idaho   1917 1939  1913 1936 1931  yes 1938 
Illinois   1911 1930  1911 1941    ---- yes 1939 
Indiana   1915 1937  1919 1936 1933  yes 1938 
Iowa   1913 1947  1913 1943 1934  yes 1938 
Kansas   1911 1953  1915 1937    ---- yes 1939 
Kentucky   1916 1936  1928 1942 1926  yes 1939 38 
 
Louisiana   1914 1953  1920 1936    ---- yes 1938 
Maine   1915 1945  1917 1936 1933  yes 1938 
Maryland   1912 1939  1916 1936 1927  yes 1938 
Massachusetts   1911 1930  1913 1936  1930  no 1938 
Michigan   1912 1937  1913 1936  1933  no 1938 
Minnesota   1913 1921  1913 1937 1929  yes 1938 
Mississippi   1948 1962  1928 1941    ---- no 1938 
Missouri   1926 1931  1917 1937    ---- yes 1939 
Montana   1915 1953  1915 1937  1923  no 1939 
Nebraska   1913 1935  1913 1936 1933  yes 1939 
Nevada   1913 1947  1913 1955 1925  yes 1939 
New 
Hampshire  
1911 1947  1913 1936 1931  yes 1938 
New Jersey   1911 1929  1913 1936 1931  yes 1939 
New Mexico   1917 1945  1931 1936    ---- no 1938 
New York   1913 1920  1915 1937 1930  yes 1938 
North Carolina   1929 1935  1923 1937    ---- no 1938 
North Dakota   1919 1925  1915 1937  1933  no 1939 
Ohio   1911 1929  1913 1936 1933  yes 1939 
Oklahoma   1915 1953  1915 1936    ---- yes 1938 
Oregon   1913 1943  1913 1937 1933  yes 1938 
Pennsylvania   1915 1937  1913 1936 1934  yes 1938 
Rhode Island   1912 1936  1923 1937    ---- no 1938 
South Carolina   1935 1949 ---- 1937    ---- no 1938 
South Dakota   1917 1947  1913 1940    ---- no 1939 
Tennessee   1919 1947  1915 1937    ---- no 1938 39 
 
Texas   1913 1947  1917 1941    ---- no 1938 
Utah   1917 1941  1913 1936 1929  yes 1938 
Vermont   1915 1951  1917 1936    ---- no 1938 
Virginia   1918 1944  1918 1938    ---- no 1938 
Washington   1911 1937  1913 1936 1933  yes 1939 
West Virginia   1913 1935  1915 1936  1931  no 1938 
Wisconsin   1911 1929  1913 1936 1925  yes 1936 
Wyoming   1915 1966  1915 1936 1929  yes 1939 
 
Sources:   See Fishback and Thomasson (2006, 2-709).  Workers' Compensation Laws: See Fishback and Kantor (2000) for date of 
initial enactment.  See Balkan (1998, 64) and Allen (2004, 170-1) for the dates in which occupational diseases were covered.  The date 
of initial enactment of the workers’ compensation law listed above is the date at which a permanent law was enacted.  New York 
passed a compulsory law in 1910 and an elective law in 1910, but the compulsory law was declared unconstitutional, and the elective 
law saw little use.  New York passed a compulsory law in 1913 after passing a constitutional amendment.  The Kentucky law of 1914 
was declared unconstitutional and was replaced by a law in 1916.  The Missouri General Assembly passed a workers’ compensation 
law in 1919, but it failed to receive enough votes in a referendum in 1920.  Another law passed in 1921 was defeated in a referendum 
in 1922 and an initiative on the ballot was again defeated in 1924.  Missouri voters finally approved a workers’ compensation law in a 
1926 referendum on a 1925 legislative act (see Kantor and Fishback 1994). Maryland (1902) and Montana (1909) passed earlier laws 
specific to miners that were declared unconstitutional. 
 
Mothers’ pension laws:  For laws enacted prior to 1920, see Thompson, 1919, pp. 7-11 and for laws enacted after 1920 see Theda 
Skocpol (1992, p. 457).  In the states of Missouri (1911), (California pre1913), Wisconsin (1912), Michigan (1911), and Oklahoma 
(1908) there were state provisions that provided funds similar to mothers’ pensions in indirect ways.  Some of the provisions were 
limited to specific cities and others were indirect means of providing funds to dependent children.  Arizona in a 1914 referendum 
passed a mothers’ pension and old-age pension system that hinged on the abolishment of the almshouses in the state, but it was found 
unconstitutional (Thompson, 1919, pp. 7-9).  More detail on the specifics of mothers’ pension laws as of 1934 are available in Stevens 
1970, pp. 28-29 and Committee on Economic Security 1937, pp. 233-249).  Carolyn Moehling provided information on the year in 
which the state switched to an aid to dependent children program that was eligible for matching grants under the Social Security Act.    
 40 
 
Old-Age Pensions:  See Stevens, 1970, 20-24 and Committee on Economic Security, 1937, pp. 160-71.  Arizona set up an old-age 
pension subject to the elimination of almshouses in a referendum in 1915, but the pension was declared unconstitutional.  
Pennsylvania passed an old-age pension law in 1923 that was declared unconstitutional in 1924.  Nevada also passed an act in 1923 
that was replaced by the 1925 act listed above.  Information contained there also offers more detailed descriptions of the laws. 
 
Aid to the Blind:  See “Public Provision for Pensions for the Blind in 1934,” Monthly Labor Review 41 (3) (September 1935), pp. 
584-601; reprinted in Stevens, 1970, 29-31.  
 
Year of First Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits to the Unemployed:  Balkan (1998, 75).  41 
 
Table 2 
Elasticities from Regressions of the Natural Log of Per Capita Relief Spending in City (1967$) 
in Year t on the Natural Log of Per Capita Relief Spending in 1923 and Change in Log State 
Manufacturing Employment  from 1923 to Year t. 
(t-statistics below each coefficient) 
   ln(per capita poor 
relief) fsc 
   1929  1931 
Natural Log of Per Capita Poor Relief in City in 1923  0.9306 0.948 
22.98 16.62 
Change in Natural log of state manufacturing 
employment from 1923 to year 
-1.482 -2.52 
-2.31 -2.53 
Constant 0.2644 0.3705 
4.5 1.16 
R-squared 0.817 0.68 
Number of Observations  167 147 
 
Sources:  Manufacturing employment from U.S. Bureau of Census (Manufacturing Censuses), 
1929 and 1931; city per capita poor relief from U.S. Bureau of the Census Financial Statistics of 




Elasticities from Regressions of the Natural Log of Per Capita Relief Spending in City (1990$) 
in 1939 on the Natural Log of Per Capita Relief Spending in 1931 and Change in Log State 
Manufacturing Employment from 1931 to 1939. 
 
   Elasticity 
t-statistic 
Per Capita Public Relief in 1931 in 1990$  0.17
6.14 







Sources:  Manufacturing employment from U.S. Bureau of Census (Manufacturing Censuses), 
1929 and 1931; City per capita poor relief in nominal terms from Baird (1942).  They are 
adjusted to 1990 dollars using the 1967 CPI from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series E-135, 
p. 211 and then multiplying by 3.91, which is the CPI conversion factor for 1967 dollars to 1990 
dollars from Officer and Williamson’s Measuring Wealth website. 43 
 
Table 4 
Cross-State Correlations of Maximum Benefits from Income Maintenance Programs Between 
Different Years 
 
  Maximum Weekly Unemployment Payments in 1967 Dollars   
  1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000   
1940  1         
1950  0.1069  1        
1960  0.3534  0.4201  1      
1970  0.0462  0.4291  0.534 1     
1980  0.078  0.375  0.2474 0.4323 1    
1990 -0.022  0.448  0.2485 0.5169 0.6552 1    
2000 -0.1714 0.501  0.2898 0.4383 0.5141 0.8037 1   
           
  Workers' Compensation Expected Benefits 
  1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1930  1         
1940  0.9203  1        
1950  0.7834  0.7658  1      
1960  0.6761  0.6551  0.913 1     
1970  0.5833  0.598  0.7968 0.8552 1    
1980  0.2724 0.2903 0.3632 0.4235 0.5045 1    
1990  0.2758 0.3118 0.3876 0.4044 0.4683 0.8441 1   
2000  0.2624 0.2824 0.4046 0.3926 0.426 0.624 0.6868  1
           
 
Mothers’ Pension (1919)/Aid to Dependent Children (1940-1960)/Aid to Families 
With Dependent Children (1970-1990)/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(2000) 
  1919 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1919  1         
1940  0.4074  1        
1950  0.3618  0.3416  1      
1960  0.1769  0.2935  0.7624 1     
1970  -0.0199 0.3382 0.4965 0.6963 1      
1980  0.1335 0.5034 0.3832 0.6425 0.9079 1    
1990  0.224 0.4773 0.2367 0.4802 0.8697 0.9383 1   
2000 0.206  0.4437  0.199 0.4551 0.8135 0.8849 0.9577  1
           
 
Sources:  Workers’ compensation expected benefits are from data set created by Samuel Allen 
and described in Allen (2004, 2009).  Weekly maximums for unemployment are Moehling from 
Moffitt, Green Book, Allen 2004, 2009.  The 1919 figures for mother’s pensions are from 
Moehling (2007).  For states with no maximum we chose a value that exceeded the highest 
maximum in the rest of the states.  In all cases states with no law were treated as missing values.  
The values for Aid to Dependent Children in 1940 are the actual maximum paid by the state to a 44 
 
family of four from data used by Carolyn Moehling (2006, 2007).  States that had not yet 
switched to aid to dependent children were treated as missing in 1940.    45 
 
Table 5 
Correlations Across States Between Programs in Various Years 
 














Workers' Compensation  1        
Unemployment Insurance  0.0259 1      
Aid to Dependent Children  0.0867 0.1282 1    
Personal Income  0.1881 0.0871 0.5891 1   
Average Weekly Earnings  0.3692 0.1505 0.5623 0.7966  1
          














Workers' Compensation  1        
Unemployment Insurance  -0.0007 1      
Aid to Dependent Children  0.2521 0.047 1    
Personal Income  0.2305 0.1286 0.7052 1   
Average Weekly Earnings  0.3925 0.1888 0.7462 0.7331  1
          














Workers' Compensation  1        
Unemployment Insurance  0.2953 1      
Aid to Dependent Children  0.5498 0.5682 1    
Personal Income  0.4184 0.4233 0.6805 1   
Average Weekly Earnings  0.2026 0.3638 0.3701 0.2777  1
          














Workers' Compensation  1        
Unemployment Insurance  0.4044 1      
Aid to Dependent Children  0.3636 0.4884 1    
Personal Income  0.4924 0.569 0.6258 1   
Average Weekly Earnings  0.2881 0.1462 0.4145 0.6194  1
          















Workers' Compensation  1        
Unemployment Insurance  0.4376 1      
Aid to Dependent Children  0.382 0.3345 1    
Personal Income  0.4336 0.148 0.6173 1   
Average Weekly Earnings  0.3602 0.0979 0.3653 0.528  1
          











Workers' Compensation  1        
Unemployment Insurance  0.4187 1      
SSI 0.0816 0.2265 1    
Aid to Dependent Children  0.2753 0.407 0.7096 1   
Personal Income  0.3584 0.4883 0.5741 0.6883  1
Average Weekly Earnings  0.3688 0.3243 0.3575 0.4819  0.487
          











Workers' Compensation  1        
Unemployment Insurance  0.3079 1      
SSI 0.0431 0.1672 1    
Aid to Dependent Children  0.275 0.3572 0.691 1   
Personal Income  0.1388 0.5258 0.4743 0.4838  1
Average Weekly Earnings  0.1619 0.3055 0.0872 0.1507  0.4147
 
Sources:  See Table 4. 47 
 
Table 6 
Regressions of the Natural Log of Benefit Levels in Census Years on Decade-Long Averages of Income and Political Variables With 
and Without Fixed Effects and Time Trends  
 
 
 Expected  Workers' 
Compensation Benefit 
Maximum Weekly UI Benefit  Maximum ADC Benefit Base 
Decade  Averages           
Percent Voting Democrat for President  0.004 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.014 0.000 -0.012
2.14 7.09 4.82 3.51 2.03 -0.1 4.28 0.03  -2.36 
Percent Voting for a Presidential 
Candidate outside the Major Parties  
0.002 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.012
0.97  3.2  1.2  1.02  1.17 -0.87 -0.37  -0.1 -1.56 
Democrats control Governor and Both 
Houses of State Legislatures  
0.081 0.072 0.032 0.014 0.055 0.008 0.104 -0.040 -0.083
1.07 1.26 0.56 0.32 1.35 0.18 0.94  -0.62  -1.37 
Democrats control Governor and Both 
Houses of State Legislatures in South   
-0.254 -0.229 -0.106 -0.060 -0.070 -0.007 -0.764 0.092 0.175
-3.7 -2.51 -1.04 -1.46  -1 -0.07 -5.76  0.86  1.83 
Republican Control of Governor and 
Both Houses of State Legislature 
-0.243 0.037 -0.066 -0.063 0.029 0.009 0.160 -0.030 -0.033
-3.5  0.6 -1.08 -1.34  0.57  0.16  1.48 -0.45 -0.57 
Years in which Both Houses of State 
Legislature Shifts 
-0.025 0.087 -0.037 0.368 0.192 0.271 1.124 -0.146 0.175
-0.09 0.48  -0.16 2.14 1.26 1.54 2.17  -0.53 0.77 
Natural Log of Per Capita State 
Personal Income in $1967 
0.777 0.186 -0.429 0.336 -0.040 0.023 -0.604 0.001 0.144
23.91  1.68 -2.02 13.29 -0.47  0.2 -5.54  0  0.43 
Year  Fixed  Effects  No  Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes Yes 
State  Fixed  Effects  No  Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No  Yes Yes 
State  Time  Trends  No No Yes  No No Yes  No No Yes 
 
Notes and Sources:  Dependent variables are in natural logs and come from sources in Table 4.  Decade-long averages of state per 





Results of Cliometric Studies of Impact of Social Welfare Programs during the Period 1900 to 1950 
 




Fishback and Kantor 
(1995) 
Wages:  Higher workers' 
compensation expected benefits 
associated with lower wages for 
nonunion workers but not union 
workers. 
Panel:  Annual state 
averages for 
occupations 1907-1923 
Controls plus state, year, and 
occupation fixed effects with 
proxy measure of WC Benefits 
to control for endogeneity 
Workers' 
Compensation, 1930s 
Balkan (1998)  Wage Rates:  Workers' 
compensation was associated 
with lower wages 
Unbalanced panel of 
hourly earnings for 72 
industries in 48 states 
for years 1933, 1935, 
1937, and 1939 
Correlates and state and year 
fixed effects.  Lagged proxy of 




Fishback and Kantor 
(1996) 
Savings:  Higher workers' 
compensation expected benefits 
associated with reduced 
savings. 




Control for income, family 
structure, age, accident risk.  
Measure of Expected Benefit 
used workers' actual wage. 
Unemployment 
Insurance, 1930s 
Balkan (1998)  Wages:  Introduction of 
Unemployment Insurance in 
late 1930s had little impact on 
wages 
Unbalanced panel of 
hourly earnings for 72 
industries in 48 states 
for years 1933, 1935, 
1937, and 1939 
Correlates and state and year 
fixed effects.  Lagged measure 
of UI maximum paid for 




Fishback (1987)   Accident Rates:  Introduction 
of workers' compensation laws 
associated with higher fatal 
accident rates in the coal 
industry. 
Panel:  Annual state 
averages for coal 
industry, 1903-1930 
Controls for mine inspections, 
coal mining activity, technology, 





Chelius (1977)  Accident Rates:  Introduction 
of workers' compensation law 
associated with fall in nonfatal 
machinery accident rates per 
member of labor force.  
Panel:  26 states from 
1900 to 1940 
State fixed effects plus controls 




Buffum (1992)  Accident Rates:  Introduction 
of workers' compensation 
associated with lower nonfatal 
machinery accident rates.   
Panel:  26 states from 
1900 to 1940 
Controls for factory inspection 
spending and various measures 




Buffum (1992)  Accident Rates:  Fatal 
industrial accidents per 100,000 
workers rise in workers' 
compensation states. 
Panel  8 states from 
1900 to 1940 
Controls for factory inspection 
spending and various measures 




Buffum (1992)  Accident Rates:  Fatal accident 
rate in bituminous coal mining 
higher in workers' 
compensation states. 
Panel of 24 coal mining 
states, 1900-1930 
State effects and variety of 
controls. 
Mother's Pensions 
(precursor of ADC), 
1910-1920 
Moehling (2007)  Family Structure:  More 
generous Mothers' pensions 
associated with increases in 
divorces and separations.  
States that extended eligibility 
to mothers other than widows 
experienced increases in births 
to single mothers.   
Pooled Individual data 
of different people from 
1910 and 1920 census 
from 48 states.  
Equivalent of state and year 
fixed effects with controls for 
many correlates. 
Aid to Dependent 
Children, 1940-1970 
Moehling (2007)  Family Structure:  ADC 
benefits not associated with 
more single motherhood for 
blacks in years 1940-1970 or 
for whites 1940-1960.  Positive 
elasticity of 0.23 to 0.37 for 
whites in 1970.  
Individual cross-
sections from 1940, 
1950, 1960, and 1970 
from census.   
Controls for individual 
characteristics and state-level 
economic factors. 50 
 
Old Age Assistance, 
1940 and 1950 
Costa (1999)  Family Structure:  Elderly 
women more likely to live on 
own. 
Pooled Cross-Sections 
of Different Individuals 
from Census, 1940 and 
1950 
Controls for individual 
characteristics, state and region 
fixed or random effects, 
differencing between eligible 
and noneligible populations. 
Old Age Assistance, 
1940 and 1950 
Friedberg (1999)  Labor Force Participation:  
Higher Old Age Assistance 
Benefits lowered Labor Force 
Participation Among the 
Elderly 
Pooled Cross-Sections 
of Different Individuals 
from Census, 1940 and 
1950 
Probit with controls for 
individual characteristics and 
state economic conditions with 
state and year fixed effects.  
Additional regressions to show 
no effect for people not eligible 
for program 
Old Age Assistance, 
1930-1950 
Parsons (1991)  Labor Force Participation:  
OAA benefits account for about 
half of the decline in the elderly 
work force between 1930 and 
1950 
Panel of State 
Averages, 1930, 1940, 
and 1950 
Pooled regressions with controls 
and with random effects. 
Old Age Assistance, 
1934-1955 
Balaan Cohen (2009)  Death Rates of Elderly:  Old 
Age Assistance reduced several 
types of mortality after 1940 
but not before.   
Pane:  Annual 
Averages for 48 states, 
1934-1955; 1937-1955; 
1940-1955 
State and year fixed effects and 
state specific time trends with 
instrument for Old-Age 
Assistance variable, plus 
regression to show no effects for 
people not eligible for program 
Old Age Assistance, 
1930-1938 
Stoian and Fishback 
(forthcoming) 
Death Rates of Elderly:  Old 
Age Assistance did not reduce 
elderly death rates 
Panel:  Annual 
averages for 75 cities, 
1930-1940  
Difference between eligible and 
non-eligible age groups with city 
and year fixed effects and 
instrument for Old Age 
Assistance variable 51 
 
Local Public Aid to 
Poor, 1923-1932 
Fox (2009)  Infant and Child Death Rates:  
About $781,000 (in 2007$) of 
poverty relief associated with 
reduction of one infant death in 
fixed effects estimates.  Effect 
reduced by city-specific time 
trends. No effect on children of 
other ages.  
Panel:  Annual 
averages for 67 cities, 
1923-1932 
Controls for city characteristics, 
city and year fixed effects, city-
specific time trends. 
New Deal Relief 
Spending, 1929-1940 
Fishback, Haines, 
and Kantor (2007) 
Death and Birth Rates:  About 
$2 million (in 2000$) in 
additional relief spending 
associated with reduction of 
one infant death, half a 
homicide, one suicide, 2.4 
deaths from infectious disease, 
one death from diarrhea.  A 
one-standard deviation increase 
in relief spending associated 
with 0.82 standard deviation 
rise in general fertility rate   
Panel:  Annual 
averages for 114 cities, 
1929-1940 
Controls for city characteristics, 
city and year fixed effects, 
instruments. 





Crime Rates:  Ten percent rise 
in work relief spending 
associated with 1.5 percent 
reduction in property crime 
rate.  Smaller effect of direct 
relief spending. 
Panel:  Annual 
averages for 81 large 
cities, 1930-1940 
Controls for city characteristics, 
city and year fixed effects, city-
specific time trends, and 
instruments. 
New Deal Emergency 
Relief Employment, 
1937, 1940 
Fleck (1999)  Private Employment:  
Increase of one emergency 
relief job associated with an 
increase in measured 
unemployed but little effect on 
private employment 
Separate Cross Sections 
of County Averages in 
1937 and again in 1940 
Large number of correlates and 
instrument for relief jobs. 52 
 




Wallis and Benjamin 
(1981) 
Private Employment:  Little or 
no effect of FERA cases per 
capita spending on private 
monthly wages.  Little effect of 
FERA average benefits on 
FERA caseloads. 
Cross Section of 52 
cities in fiscal year, 
1934-1935 
In wage equation correlates for 
aggregated demand and prior 
wages.  In case equation 
correlates and instruments for 
FERA benefit levels. 
New Deal Relief 
spending, 1932-1940 
Neumann, Fishback, 
and Kantor (2010 
forthcoming) 
Private Employment:  Positive 
effect of relief spending on 
private employment prior to 
1936.  Negative effect of relief 
spending on private 
employment after 1936. 
Panel of monthly 
averages from January 
1933 through 
December 1939 for 44 
major cities. 
Panel VAR with differencing 
and controls for serial 
correlation.  No endogeneity if 
there is a one-month or more lag 
in effects of each variable on 
other variables. 
Relief Spending, 1930s  Matthews and 
Benjamin (1992) 
Private Employment:  An 
additional New Deal relief job 
crowded out about one-third of 
a private job in 1933 and about 
nine/tenths of a private job in 
1939 
Panel of annual state 
averages, 1932 
Through 1939 
Pooled regressions with controls 
and instruments 




and Kantor (2005) 
Retail Sales:  Dollar increase of 
public works and relief 
spending per capita associated 
with rise in retail sales per 
capita of roughly 40 cents. 
Cross-section of 
Growth rates for U.S. 
Counties, 1929-1939, 
1929-1935, 1933-1939 
Large number of correlates and 
instrument for public works and 
relief. 




and Kantor (2006) 
Net Migration:  Increase in 
public works and relief 
spending leads to increase in 
net migration. 
Cross-section of county 
averages during 1930s. 
Large number of correlates and 
instrument for public works and 
relief. 




and Kantor (2009 
Internal Migration:  Public 
works and relief spending led to 
15 percent more internal 
migration within the U.S. 
Cross-section of 460 
state economic areas, 
1935-1940 
Several correlates and 
instrument for public works and 
relief in a structural choice 
model. 53 
 




Private Charitable Spending:  
An additional dollar of New 
Deal spending reduced church 
charitable spending by about 29 
percent of the maximum it 
could have reduced it.   
Panel of annual state 
averages, 1933 through 
1939. 
State and year fixed effects, 
region-specific time trends, 
instruments 
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Figure 1 



































1923 Per Cap. Govt. Cost Payment
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Sources:  Estimates for U.S. cities are the sum of per capita spending on hospitals in the city plus 
per capita spending on hospitals for the state in 1923 and 1930 from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census’s Financial Statistics of Cities and Financial Statistics of States for 1923 and 1930 (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1925c, 1925s, 1932c, 1932s).  The 1923 and 1930 values for the U.S. cities 
were adjusted to 1990 dollars using the CPI comparisons at Officer and Williamson’s Measuring 
Worth website.  We did not include spending on hospitals listed as transfers from state 
government to other governments to avoid double-counting if such state spending might have 
been used to fund city spending.  County government spending is missing. 55 
 
Figure 2 
Rough Estimates of Per Capita Government Cost Payments on Poverty and Unemployment 























1923 Per Capita Relief
























































































































































































Sources:  Estimates for U.S. cities are the sum of per capita spending in the city plus per capita 
spending for the state in 1923 and 1930 from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’s Financial 
Statistics of Cities and Financial Statistics of States for 1923 and 1930 (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1925c, 1925s, 1932c, 1932s).  The 1923 and 1930 values for the U.S. cities were adjusted 
to 1990 dollars using the CPI comparisons at Officer and Williamson’s Measuring Worth 
website.  The per capita city spending includes governmental cost payments by the city 
government on outdoor poor relief, poor institutions, care of children, other charities, and 
mothers’ pensions.  The state per capita spending includes governmental cost payments for 
outdoor poor relief, state poor institutions care of children in state institutions, care of blind, 
deaf, and mute in state institutions, other charities in state institutions, relief to mothers and relief 
to all others.  We did not include spending on poor institutions all other, care of children all 
other, care of blind, deaf and mute all other, and other charities all other to avoid double-
counting if such state spending might have been used to fund city spending.   Inclusion of this 






























1931 Per Capita Relief





















































































































Source and notes.  Data are from Baird (1942).  They are adjusted to 1990 dollars using the 1967 
CPI from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series E-135, p. 211 and then multiplying by 3.91, 
which is the CPI conversion factor for 1967 dollars to 1990 dollars from Officer and 
Williamson’s Measuring Wealth website.  Per capita relief spending includes spending from 
federal, state, and local sources.  It includes direct relief payments, work relief payments, and 
public assistance through old-age assistance, aid-to-the-blind, and aid to dependent child 




Ratio of Expected Workers’ Compensation Benefits to Annual Manufacturing Earnings for 
Typical Worker Paid National Average Manufacturing Wage with Three Dependents by State, 






























WC Benefit/Annual Wage 1940















































































WC Benefit/Annual Wage 1970





















































Source:  Source:  See Allen (2009, 2004).  The average expected benefit as a share of annual 
manufacturing earnings shows the typical workers’ compensation payments for different types of 
injuries weighted by the probability of the accident in 1940 divided by a measure of the national 
average wage.  The ratio here is for a worker with the national average weekly earnings.  State 
workers’ compensation benefits are calculated based on the workers average earnings, the extent 
of the injury, and waiting periods.  Payouts for different types of injuries turn out to vary in ways 
across states that do not lead to especially high correlations across types of accidents.  As a 
result, Samuel Allen (2009, 2004) and Price Fishback and Shawn Kantor (2000) developed a 
comprehensive expected benefits measure for workers’ compensation based on the discounted 
present value at the time of the accident of the typical stream of workers’ compensation benefits 
for four types of accidents: temporary total disability that lasts five weeks, a permanent partial 
disability of the loss of a hand (adjusted downward because most permanent partial disabilities 
are less severe), permanent total disability, and death).  The discount rate for the present value is 
assumed to be 5 percent, which has been a typical discount rate chosen when states paid out 
lump sums.  The “typical” worker was assumed to be a married man with a wife and two 
children ages 8 and 10, and he was earning the national average in the year.  The present values 
of the payout are then weighted by the probability of each type of accident in 1940.  This 
expected benefit is then reported as a percentage of the annual earnings someone would receive 
earning the national weekly wage for the year.  The goal in the measure is to show how the 
expected benefits as a share of the wage change across time and place based on the parameters in 
the law.  Had we allowed the accident rates used to weight the payments for each type of injury 
to vary across years, the expected benefit ratio would have trended downward because accident 
rates trended downward over the course of the century. 59 
 
Figure 5a 
Aid to Dependent Children to Family of 3 in 1970 and Maximum Payment to Family of 4 in 






























Real Maximum ADC Payment 1940















































Aid to Dependent Children Maximum Payment to Family of 3 in 1970 and ADC/Temporary Aid 
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Sources:  The 1940 payments are from data set provided by Carolyn Moehling from her 2006 
and 2007 papers.  The 1970 and 2000 payments are from U.S. House of Representatives, Ways 
and Means Committee 1990, 2000).  The 1940 payments are the highest payments reported for 
ADC for families of four.  In a number of cases the actual maximum exceeded the maximum 
listed in the state statute.  A number of states had no maximums.  The 1970 and 2000 payments 
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Source:  The data on unemployment weekly maximums can be found on the United States 
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